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THE REMOTE SITE  
DOCTRINE IN ALASKA 
JOSEPH A. KALAMARIDES* 
Alaska’s unique geography and abundance of valuable 
natural resources in remote locations has created a great 
deal of employment in remote sites, requiring substantial 
travel.  In this Comment, the author examines the “remote 
site doctrine,” a body of statutory and common law dealing 
with workers’ compensation issues arising from employ-
ment at these remote locations. 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Ever since United States Secretary of State William Seward negoti-
ated the state’s purchase, Alaska has been known as the country’s “last 
frontier.”1  Distinguished by its rugged landscape and extreme climate, 
Alaska is one-fifth the size of all other U.S. states combined and reaches 
so far to the west that it extends into the Eastern Hemisphere.2  Much of 
this land remains wilderness, with various locations around the state re-
maining inaccessible except by air. 
With an abundance of valuable resources located in largely unset-
tled areas, Alaska is unique in part because of the large number of em-
ployees who have historically worked away from home at various re-
mote sites around the state.  From the oil fields in Prudhoe Bay to the 
construction sites on the Aleutian Chain, individuals work hundreds of 
miles from home in harsh weather conditions.  Employers in these re-
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 1. ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA, INC., THE NEW ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA 409 
(15th ed. 1982). 
 2. State of Alaska, Department of Commerce, Geography of Alaska, at 
http://www.commerce.state.ak.us/oed/student_info/learn/aboutgeography.htm. 
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mote locations provide housing and meals to their employees; by virtue 
of the location, these workers are required to work, live, and eat at the 
job site, often for weeks at a time. 
The unique character of employment in remote locations around 
Alaska, including the extent to which employees rely on their employers 
and the loss of freedom that employees experience during their employ-
ment, raises a number of interesting legal questions.  In particular, courts 
have shaped workers’ compensation law to reflect working conditions in 
these locales. 
In 1959, Alaska completely rewrote its workers’ compensation laws 
at the end of the state’s first legislative session.3  After two years of 
hearings, the Alaska Legislature passed a comprehensive act, which was 
patterned after the 1964 version of the Federal Longshore and Harbor-
workers’ Compensation Act4 and was intended to provide quick and 
immediate medical and compensation benefits for those employees in-
jured on the job.5  In exchange, the employees could not file negligence 
suits against their employers.6  In essence, the Act provides mandatory 
insurance coverage for employees and is the exclusive remedy for work-
related injuries.7 
The extent and breadth of Alaska’s workers’ compensation cover-
age has often been litigated.8  Coverage is generally activated when an 
employee begins the job each day and ends when he completes the job 
for that day.9  Injuries incurred while traveling to and from work are not 
covered unless they fall under a recognized exception to the rule.10  In 
addition, injuries that occur while the employee is involved in personal 
activities are not covered, but several exceptions exist.11  One important 
exception that has evolved over time in Alaska involves injuries to 
workers employed in remote locations, who are subject to certain life-
style restrictions because of their work.12 
 
 3. ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA, INC., supra note 1, at 412. 
 4. 33 U.S.C. § 922 (1964).  See Fischback & Moore of Alaska, Inc. v. Lynn, 430 
P.2d 909, 911 n.11 (Alaska 1967) (comparing the Alaska Workers’ Compensation Act to 
the federal act).    
 5. Hewing v. Peter Kiewit & Sons, 586 P.2d 182, 187 (Alaska 1978). 
 6. M-K Rivers v. Schleifman, 599 P.2d 132, 135 (Alaska 1979). 
 7. See id. 
 8. See, e.g., id.  See also Dep’t of Highways v. Johns, 422 P.2d 855, 860–61 
(Alaska 1967); Northern Corp. v. Seari, 409 P.2d 845 (Alaska 1966); R.C.A. Serv. Co. v. 
Liggett, 394 P.2d 675 (Alaska 1964). 
 9. See R.C.A. Serv. Co., 394 P.2d at 677–78. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. at 678-80. 
 12. E.g., Northern Corp., 409 P.2d at 847. 
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In a series of cases in which the Alaska Supreme Court has con-
fronted the issues arising from work at these remote locations, the court 
has adopted and defined what is known as the “remote site doctrine.”13  
This Comment will examine the shape this doctrine has taken in Alaska 
by first addressing the legislative background and cases that adopted the 
doctrine and defined its limits.  It will then review the Alaska legislative 
reaction to the initial case law.  Finally, this Comment will examine the 
current status of the doctrine in Alaska. 
II.  THE ADOPTION AND DEFINITION OF THE LIMITS OF THE REMOTE 
SITE DOCTRINE 
A. Legislative Background: Basis for Recovery under the Alaska 
Workers’ Compensation Act 
The remote site doctrine in Alaska common law traces its roots to 
jurisprudence from more general areas of workers’ compensation law 
developed under the Alaska Workers’ Compensation Act.14  Understand-
ing what has shaped the courts’ decision in this area requires an exami-
nation of the legal framework from which the doctrine springs. 
Coverage under the Alaska Workers’ Compensation Act requires 
that an injury “arise out of and in the course of employment.”15  Under 
this rule, injuries that occur on the job while an employee is performing 
his job duties are compensable.  On the other hand, an injury caused by 
personal activity is not considered work-related even if that injury oc-
curred on the employer’s premises. 
While many cases are easy to identify as “aris[ing] out of the 
course of employment,” work-related travel and situations in which the 
employee is injured at his workplace outside of working hours present 
particularly vexing issues.  Whether an injury arose out of or in the 
course of employment, such that it is compensable, requires that (1) the 
injury was “reasonably foreseeable” to the employer and (2) that the in-
jury was “incidental” to the employment.16  For instance, the Alaska Su-
preme Court adopted the position articulated by Justice Cardozo and ap-
plied this test when considering the compensability of injuries sustained 
while traveling for a dual purpose: 
If the work of the employee creates the necessity for travel, he is in 
the course of his employment, though he is serving at the same time 
some purpose of his own. . . . If, however, the work has had no part in 
 
 13. Id.; M-K Rivers v. Schleifman, 599 P.2d 132, 136 (Alaska 1979); Anderson v. 
Employers Liab. Assurance Co., 498 P.2d 288, 290 (Alaska 1972). 
 14. ALASKA STAT. § 23.30.005–.400 (Michie 2003). 
15.  Id. at § 23.30.395(17), 23.30.395(2). 
 16. Anchorage Roofing Co. v. Gonzales, 507 P.2d 501, 505 (Alaska 1973). 
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creating the necessity for travel, if the journey would have gone for-
ward though the business errand had been dropped, and would have 
been canceled upon failure of the private purpose, though the business 
errand was undone, the travel is then personal, and personal the risk.17 
Under this rule, if work creates the necessity for the employee’s travels, 
the employee is protected by workers’ compensation even when the in-
jury-causing activity is not directly aimed at advancing the employer’s 
interest.18 
B. R.C.A. Service Co. v. Liggett and the Going and Coming Rule 
Injuries occurring on an employer’s premises are much more likely 
to be covered under the Alaska Workers’ Compensation Act than inju-
ries occurring off-site.19  The  rationale for this tendency is that the 
premises of the employer is a defined zone within which the employer 
arguably controls the actions of its employees; when the employee steps 
over the threshold, the employer takes possession of the employee and 
thus assumes responsibility for the employee’s safety.20  On the other 
hand, when off-site, an employee is generally considered to be responsi-
ble for his own actions.21  Recognizing these circumstances, Alaska 
courts have adopted the “Going and Coming Rule,” under which travel 
to and from work is considered a “personal activity.”22  Under this rule, 
injuries occurring outside the employer’s premises while an employee is 
traveling to or from work are not considered to arise out of and in the 
course of employment. 
In R.C.A. Service Co. v. Liggett,23 the Alaska Supreme Court’s first 
treatment of employee injuries in remote work locations, the court up-
held the Going and Coming Rule.24  There, Fred Liggett was killed in a 
plane crash during a journey from his job site in Clear, Alaska, to his 
home in Fairbanks after working on Christmas Day at his employer’s re-
quest.25  Prior to the accident, Liggett worked for R.C.A. for six months, 
during which time he lived at R.C.A.’s camp all but two nights a week.26  
On Saturday and Wednesday nights, Liggett habitually flew home to 
Fairbanks to spend time with his family.27  On this Christmas, although 
 
 17. Id. at 504 (quoting Marks’ Dependants v. Gray, 167 N.E. 181, 183 (N.Y.1929)). 
 18. See id. 
 19. Seville v. Holland Am. Line Westours, 977 P.2d 103, 106 (Alaska 1999). 
 20. Luth v. Rogers & Babler Constr. Co.,  507 P.2d 761, 764 (Alaska 1973). 
 21. Seville, 977 P.2d at 106. 
 22. Sokolowski v. Best W. Golden Lion Hotel, 813 P.2d 286, 289 (Alaska 1991). 
 23. 394 P.2d 675 (Alaska 1964). 
 24. Id. at 676. 
 25. Id. at 676–77. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. at 676. 
KALAMARIDES.DOC 12/9/2004  11:50 AM 
2004] THE REMOTE SITE DOCTRINE 293 
Liggett had spent the holiday at work at R.C.A.’s request, he paid for his 
own flight home on a private plane.28 
The Alaska Workers’ Compensation Board found that Liggett’s 
death arose out of the course of his employment with R.C.A.29  How-
ever, in reviewing the case, the Supreme Court of Alaska adopted the 
Going and Coming Rule and reversed the Board’s decision: 
Although Alaska has no case directly on point, it is well settled in 
most jurisdictions that injuries occurring off the employer’s premises 
while the employee is going to or coming from work do not arise in 
the course of his employment.  We believe that the rule is reasonable 
and logical and that it draws a practical line for determining where the 
employer’s liability to pay compensation begins and ends.30 
The court held that Liggett’s trip to be with his family on Christmas Day 
was purely a personal choice.31  The employer did not arrange or pay for 
the transportation or exercise any control over the private carrier.32  Fur-
ther, no express or implied contract of employment covered Liggett dur-
ing his flight from Clear to Fairbanks.33  Thus, the court held that be-
cause no evidence in the record demonstrated that the trip was a “part of 
the service [Liggett] was performing for his employer,” his death was 
not compensable.34 
C. The Adoption of the Remote Site Doctrine Exception 
Two years after the court’s holding in R.C.A. Service Co., in North-
ern Corp. v. Saari,35 the Alaska Supreme Court reviewed another death 
at a remote site.36  Northern had contracted to perform work at a U.S. Air 
Force installation located at Sparrevohn, a remote location 170 miles 
west of Anchorage.37  The site was inaccessible except by air, and the 
flying schedule between Sparrevohn and Anchorage was uncertain due 
to weather conditions.38 
Eino Saari lived and worked at Northern’s camp in Sparrevohn.39  
He was employed as a carpenter and worked set hours of 7:00 a.m. to 
 
28.  Id. at 677. 
 29. Id. at 676.  The statute in force at the time defined “injury” as “an accidental in-
jury or death arising out of and in the course of employment.”  ALASKA STAT. § 
23.30.265(17) (Michie 1995). 
 30. R.C.A. Serv. Co., 394 P.2d at 677–78. 
 31. Id. at 680. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. 
 35. 409 P.2d 845 (Alaska 1966). 
 36. Id. at 846. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. 
 39. See id. at 847. 
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5:30 p.m. six days a week.40  No recreational facilities were furnished 
other than a mess hall.41  However, Northern had made an arrangement 
with the Air Force that allowed Northern employees to use the facilities 
at the non-commissioned officers’ club at the base after working hours.42  
The club was 700 yards away from the camp and was accessible by a 
road commonly used by the employees to make the trip.43 
The accident that resulted in Saari’s death occurred when Saari and 
a friend were returning to camp from the club in the evening along the 
road.44  Saari died of a skull fracture after he slipped off of the edge of 
the road and fell ten feet into a creek.45  The accident occurred while 
Saari was not on duty.46 
The supreme court distinguished the facts of Northern Corp. from 
those in R.C.A. Service Co. and declined to apply the Going and Coming 
Rule.47  The court emphasized that the recreational facilities were pro-
vided by Northern for the benefit and enjoyment of the employees: 
By reason of the restricted conditions of employment at Sparrevohn, it 
is reasonable to conclude that Northern’s arrangement for the use of 
recreational facilities at the air base was an important factor in per-
sonnel relations—that such an arrangement contributed to a higher 
degree of efficiency of Northern’s work at Sparrevohn.48 
The court held that because of the lifestyle restrictions that employment 
at the camp entailed and the solitary outlet of employer-provided recrea-
tional facilities, the possibility of injury associated with going to and 
from the club at the base was a foreseeable risk of employment.49  Thus, 
the injury was deemed to have arisen out of the course of Saari’s em-
ployment and was compensable.50 
In State v. Johns,51  the Alaska Supreme Court considered whether 
an employer’s compensation for transportation expenses brought an in-
jury resulting during the employee’s trip home from the work site within 
an exception to the Going and Coming Rule.52  The Alaska Department 
of Highways was performing road construction at Ernestine Camp, 
 
 40. Id. at 846. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. at 847. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. 
 51. 422 P.2d 855 (Alaska 1967). 
 52. Id. at 860. 
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which was located forty-seven miles from Valdez.53  The State needed 
more workers but had no additional living facilities at the camp.54  The 
road work needed to be completed before the ground froze solid.55 
In order to lure more workers to the site, the State struck a deal with 
Harry Johns, who lived fifty-four miles from the camp.56  Johns was fur-
nished gasoline for the trip to and from his residence as compensation 
for his transportation expenses.57  He was also paid an extra hour and a 
half per day to cover his travel time.58 
Johns worked the first day and then proceeded to drive home.59  He 
was provided 10 gallons of gas for the drive.60  Three miles from the 
camp, his car incurred a flat tire.61  Because Johns did not have a spare, 
he hitched a ride with a military vehicle back to the camp.62  On the way, 
the vehicle strayed from the highway and crashed.63  Johns suffered se-
vere injuries from the accident.64 
The supreme court held that the Going and Coming Rule adopted in 
R.C.A. Service Co. did not apply to Johns’ case and instead, that the facts 
brought Johns within the remote site doctrine.65  The court held that 
workers’ compensation should be awarded to Johns because the State, 
by paying Johns for his travel time, had “impliedly agreed that the em-
ployment relationship was to continue during travel” and thus such 
travel time was an incident of Johns’ employment.66 
D. Personal Activity and the Remote Site Doctrine 
Two subsequent cases expanded the remote site doctrine by consid-
ering the inclusion of personal activities within the exception.  In Ander-
son v. Employers Liability Assurance Corp.67 and M-K Rivers v. 
Schleifman,68 the court defined which factors a court should consider 
 
 53. Id. at 857 n.7. 
 54. Id. at 859. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. at 857. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. at 860 n.21 (citing an unpublished Workmen’s Compensation Board deci-
sion). 
 59. Id. at 857. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. at 857–58. 
 62. Id. at 858. 
 63. Id. 
 64. See id. at 857 n.3. 
 65. Id. at 860. 
 66. Id. 
 67. 498 P.2d 288 (Alaska 1972). 
 68. 599 P.2d 132 (Alaska 1979). 
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when addressing injuries resulting from personal activities in a remote 
work-site setting.69 
Richard Anderson was employed by Universal Services, Inc., as an 
electrician-lineman on Amchitka Island in the Aleutians.70  As did many 
other of the employees, Anderson lived on the employer’s premises and 
was provided with food and lodging.71  Anderson normally worked from 
8:00 a.m. to 5:30 p.m.; however, he was on call twenty-four hours a day 
and was often called during off-duty hours to perform various jobs.72 
In addition to food and lodging, Anderson’s employer also pro-
vided a bartender and liquor license for the “Rat Roost” bar on the prem-
ises.73  One evening at the “Rat Roost,” Anderson entered into a contest 
with a fellow employee to determine which man could climb a transmis-
sion pole the quickest.74  After the wager was made, the other employee 
climbed the pole with no problems.75  Then Anderson tried, but 
slipped.76  He tried a second time, but lost his grip and fell to the ground, 
landing on his seat.77  He fractured his wrist and crushed two vertebrae 
in the fall.78 
The pivotal issue in Anderson was the application of the standard 
enunciated by the Alaska Supreme Court in Northern Corp.  Under 
Northern Corp., a court should examine whether the injured employee’s 
activities had benefited the employer and whether the accident was fore-
seeable.79  Applying this criteria in Anderson, the employer argued that 
the injury did not fall within the exception provided by the earlier 
cases.80  Conceding that it had provided the bar to employees, the em-
ployer argued that Anderson’s activity was neither a typical bar activity 
nor one that was actively encouraged by the employer and thus such an 
injury was not foreseeable.81 
The court disagreed with the employer’s argument, emphasizing 
that, as in Northern Corp., Anderson worked at a remote site, where he 
was “required by the conditions of his employment to reside on the em-
 
 69. See Anderson, 498 P.2d at 292; M-K Rivers, 599 P.2d at 135–36. 
 70. Anderson, 498 P.2d at 289. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. 
 79. See Northern Corp. v. Saari, 409 P.2d 845, 845–46 (Alaska 1966). 
 80. Anderson, 498 P.2d at 292–93. 
 81. Id. at 292. 
KALAMARIDES.DOC 12/9/2004  11:50 AM 
2004] THE REMOTE SITE DOCTRINE 297 
ployer’s premises.”82  Absent the range of other recreational diversions 
typically available in populated areas, recreation at the bar provided by 
the employer became an incident of employment with the company.83  In 
addition, the court held that the injury-causing activity benefited the em-
ployer by providing a recreational outlet to the employees, which in-
creased their efficiency back at work.84  The court therefore expanded 
the remote site doctrine by articulating a basis for awarding compensa-
tion for injuries occurring during recreational pursuits, even when the 
specific activity is not provided for or actively encouraged by the em-
ployer, such as the officer’s club in Northern Corp.  The court stated: 
The remote site worker is required as a condition of his employment 
to do all of his eating, sleeping and socializing on the work premises.  
Activities normally totally divorced from his work routine then be-
come a part of the working conditions to which he is subjected.  For 
these reasons many courts have concluded that when an employee is 
working in a remote area far from family and friends and the normal 
recreational outlets available to the working man, his recreational ac-
tivities become an incident of his employment.85 
The court concluded that when an employee at a remote site is injured 
while engaging in “reasonable” recreational activities, the injuries are 
work-related.86  Despite Anderson’s employer’s protests, the court held 
that the application of the rule did not depend on whether the activities 
are directly provided for or sponsored by the employer or whether the 
activities are engaged in frequently enough by employees for such activ-
ity to be foreseeable by the employer.87  In addition, the court refused to 
draw a bright line as to what recreational activities were “reasonable” 
and instead indicated that the answer depends on the conditions of the 
employment—i.e., reasonableness must be examined considering the to-
tality of the circumstances and what a reasonable person might do under 
similar conditions.88  Based on these considerations, the court found the 
pole-climbing activity in Anderson to be reasonable.89 
In M-K Rivers, plaintiff Robert Schleifman was employed at the 
Sourdough pipeline camp, a remote site thirty miles from Glennallen, 
Alaska.90  On the day at issue, he finished his work day at 4:30 p.m. on a 
Friday afternoon.91  He was scheduled to go on a rest and relaxation 
 
 82. Id. at 290 (citations omitted). 
 83. Id. at 292. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. at 290. 
 86. Id. at 292. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. at 293. 
 89. Id. 
 90. 599 P.2d 132, 133 (Alaska 1979). 
 91. Id. 
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leave on Monday and, in need of cash, left the camp on his motorcycle 
for Glennallen to cash his paycheck.92  While en route, his motorcycle 
veered off the road, resulting in serious injuries to Schleifman.93 
The Workers’ Compensation Board denied and dismissed the case, 
holding that because the employment did not create the risk that resulted 
in the injury, the injury did not arise out of the course and scope of 
Schleifman’s employment.94  Schleifman appealed.95  The Alaska Su-
preme Court affirmed the superior court’s reversal of the Board’s deci-
sion.96  The supreme court defined the primary inquiry as “whether 
[Schleifman’s] injury was substantially caused by, or the result of, the 
employment relation.”97  Relying on Anderson, the court held that the act 
of an employee driving from the remote site to Glennallen to cash a pay-
check was “reasonably contemplated and foreseeable by the employment 
situation,” even though the activity was not provided for by Schleif-
man’s employer.98  Specifically, because Schleifman needed cash to 
travel to Anchorage on the following Monday, his trip was reasonable 
and foreseeable under the circumstances.99  Additionally, the court de-
termined that the employer benefited from writing paychecks rather than 
paying employees in cash, and thus derived an indirect benefit from its 
employees’ ability to cash such checks elsewhere.100 
In a footnote to the case, the court quoted the following passage 
from O’Keeffe v. Smith, Hinchman & Grylls Associates, Inc.,101 to define 
the limits of their ruling.  The court noted that when an injury is sus-
tained during the performance of a personal activity at a remote site, 
“[t]he line is drawn only at those cases where an employee has become 
‘so thoroughly disconnected from the service of his employer that it 
would be entirely unreasonable to say that injuries suffered by him arose 
out of and in the course of his employment.’”102 
Should R.C.A. Service Co. have governed this case, or was 
Schleifman’s ability to cash his own paycheck so beneficial to the em-
ployer that the personal activity became incident to his employment?  
Was the nature of this personal activity any different from that engaged 
in by Liggett?  Justice Mathews’ dissent argued that the two activities 
 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. at 134. 
 95. Id. at 133. 
 96. Id. at 134. 
 97. Id. at 135. 
 98. Id. at 136. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. 
 101. 380 U.S. 359, 362 (1965). 
 102. M-K Rivers, 599 P.2d at 135 n.4 (quoting O’Keefe, 380 U.S. at 362). 
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were indistinguishable.103  The justice concluded that the necessity of 
traveling to cash an employee paycheck was not a unique incident of 
Schleifman’s employment, as most employees must cash their pay-
checks and must travel to a bank to do so as well.104  The justice argued 
that to make such an activity compensable “stretches the course of em-
ployment standard beyond the breaking point.”105 
III.  LEGISLATIVE REACTION TO THE DOCTRINE 
In 1982, the Alaska Legislature amended its earlier definition of 
“arising out of and in the course of employment”: 
“[A]rising out of and in the course of employment” includes em-
ployer-required or supplied travel to and from a remote job site; ac-
tivities performed at the direction or under the control of the em-
ployer; and employer-sanctioned activities at employer-provided 
facilities; but excludes activities of a personal nature away from em-
ployer-provided facilities.106 
The amendment constituted a specific attempt to narrow the scope of 
coverage under Alaska’s Workers’ Compensation Act for injuries in-
curred on remote work sites.  Each section of the new language was in-
tended to either alter the outcome of future cases resembling the ones 
discussed earlier in this Comment that invoked the remote site excep-
tion, or to solidify the outcomes of earlier cases in which such an excep-
tion was denied.  The first clause, for example, discussing “employer-
required or supplied travel to and from a remote job site” upholds the 
rule applied in R.C.A. Service Co. v. Liggett and excludes injuries in-
curred in travel to and from work that is not reimbursed or provided by 
the employer.  The remaining sections of the amended definition were 
aimed at curbing the extension of coverage to injuries incurred during 
the performance of personal activities, like those engaged in by the em-
ployees in Northern Corp., Anderson, and M-K Rivers, which were nei-
ther specifically sanctioned nor performed under the direction of the em-
ployer, or were undertaken outside of an employer facility. 
The new statutory definition was first examined by the court in 
LeSuer-Johnson v.  Rollins-Burdick Hunter,107 a case having nothing to 
do with remote work sites.108  In that case, Judi J. LeSuer-Johnson was 
injured at a softball game while playing on a team sponsored by her em-
 
 103. Id. at 136. 
 104. Id. at 136–37. 
 105. Id. 
 106. ALASKA STAT. § 23.30.265(2) (Michie 1990) (current version at ALASKA STAT. § 
23.30.395(2) (Michie 2002)). 
 107. 808 P.2d 266 (Alaska 1991). 
 108. Id. 
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ployer.109  The injury occurred at an Anchorage ballpark, where LeSuer-
Johnson’s team was playing against an opponent in the insurance 
league.110  The employer provided bats, balls, T-shirts, and caps for the 
team members and paid $250 to the league’s organizers, who rented the 
ball field and purchased bases.111  LeSeur-Johnson later stated that she 
felt pressured by her co-workers to participate.112 
The Alaska Workers’ Compensation Board found that LeSuer-
Johnson’s claim was compensable, reasoning that participation on the 
team was an employer-sanctioned activity and that the activity occurred 
at an employer-provided facility.113  The Alaska Supreme Court agreed 
with the Board: 
In our view, the first decision of the board was correct.  That portion 
of AS 23.30.265(2) which pertains to employer-sanctioned activities 
at employer-provided facilities is not limited to remote job sites as the 
statute is written.  If the legislature had intended such a limitation it 
could have easily been expressed.114 
However, as a result of this decision, in 1994 the Alaska State Legisla-
ture amended the law to narrow the definition of “arising out of and in 
the course of employment” even further by providing that the definition 
“excludes recreational league activities sponsored by the employer, 
unless participation is required as a condition of employment.”115 
IV.  CURRENT STATUS OF THE REMOTE SITE DOCTRINE 
Two recent cases have again examined the extent to which an em-
ployee’s injuries resulting from personal activity at a remote site must be 
compensated by workers’ compensation: Norcon v. Alaska Workers’ 
Compensation Board116 and Doyon Universal Services v. Allen.117  To-
gether, these cases demonstrate that despite legislative action, the Alaska 
Supreme Court continues to follow the same approach in analyzing re-
mote site cases, thus sustaining the existence of the remote site doctrine. 
In Norcon, Kenneth Siebert was employed by Norcon, Inc. as a 
crane operator on the Exxon Valdez oil spill cleanup and worked seven 
days a week, twelve hours a day, without any vacations for eight weeks 
 
 109. Id. at 266. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. at 267. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. 
 115. ALASKA STAT. § 23.30.395(2) (Michie 2002). 
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at a time.118  During this time he resided at a “man camp” located four 
and a half miles from Valdez, Alaska.119 
On the morning of his death, Siebert got out of bed, showered, 
shaved, and exchanged pleasantries with his roommate, who remained in 
bed.120  A short time later, the roommate heard a thud and then saw 
Siebert lying on the floor.121  Later examination revealed that Siebert had 
suffered ventricular fibrillation, which resulted in sudden cardiac 
death.122 
The Alaska Supreme Court examined whether the remote site doc-
trine applied to the facts of the case and thus whether Siebert’s employer 
would be liable under the Workers’ Compensation Act.123  In a footnote, 
the court concluded that the remote site doctrine did not apply: 
 
We conclude the “remote site” theory is inapplicable in this case.  The 
principle behind the “remote site” theory is that because a worker at a 
remote site is required, as a condition of employment to eat, sleep and 
socialize on the work premises, activities normally divorced from his 
work become part of the working conditions to which the worker is 
subjected. 
* * * * * 
Getting ready for work is not an activity choice made as a result of 
limited activities offered at a remote site.  It is an activity that most 
employees engage in before they go to work regardless of their loca-
tion.  Therefore, it does not fall within the parameters of the “remote 
site” theory.124 
Norcon thus marked the first case wherein, even though the em-
ployee worked at a remote site, his injury-causing activity did not trigger 
the doctrine.  The court focused on whether such activity would have 
been undertaken regardless of the work location,125 and thereby created a 
new class of activities that, although performed at a remote work site, 
may not be covered under the remote site doctrine.  Intuitively, readying 
for work is not so different an activity from traveling to a bank to cash a 
paycheck, as Schleifman did in M-K Rivers.  What then might be the dis-
tinction between the two activities?  This exact question was answered 
by the court six years later. 
In Doyon Universal Services, the Alaska Supreme Court revisited 
the question of which personal activities actually trigger the remote site 
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doctrine.126  Lawrence Allen worked as a cook at a remote site on the 
Trans-Alaska Pipeline.127  While at work, Allen habitually ate at the em-
ployee cafeteria.128  Employer-provided facilities, such as the cafeteria, 
were the only room-and-board options available to the employees at the 
remote site.129 
On August 21, 1997, Allen traveled to the remote site for work.130  
He ate dinner in the cafeteria, which included “pork chops, mashed pota-
toes, gravy, and three or four Brussels sprouts.”131  Two hours later he 
felt pain in his stomach, which continued to intensify.132  By the next day 
he was vomiting and discovered blood in his stool.133  Allen was flown 
to Anchorage, where he was admitted to the Alaska Native Medical Cen-
ter.134 
The doctors determined that Allen’s small intestine was obstructed 
by two bezoars, which were surgically removed.135  The medical report 
revealed that the bezoars contained dense necrotic vegetable matter con-
taining traces of undigested Brussels sprouts.136 
The Workers’ Compensation Board, analyzing the case under the 
1982 amendment to the Alaska Workers’ Compensation Act, found that 
Allen’s injury occurred during an “employer sanctioned activity” in an 
“employer provided facility.”137  The Board concluded that the injury 
was thus within the course and scope of Allen’s employment.138  The su-
preme court also held Allen’s employer liable for the injury, but ex-
pressly relied on the remote site doctrine in making its decision.139  The 
court explained that in remote locations, “everyday” employee activities 
that do not appear work-related and thus would not generally be com-
pensable under workers’ compensation are covered under the remote site 
doctrine “because the requirement of living at the remote site limits the 
employee’s activities choices.”140  The court determined that Allen’s 
choices of what he could eat at the camp were limited: 
 
 126. Doyon Universal Serv. v. Allen, 999 P.2d 764, 768–70 (Alaska 2000). 
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Allen had little or no choice as to what he could eat, how it would be 
prepared, who would prepare it, or the quality of the ingredients. The 
limits placed on Allen’s choices are further evident in the fact that he 
does not cook or eat Brussels sprouts at home.141 
Based on the fact that Allen’s meal was “an activity choice made as a 
result of limited activities offered at a remote site,” the court held that 
the injury was compensable under the remote site doctrine.142 
In a footnote, the court distinguished Norcon from this holding, in-
dicating that an employee’s activity choices must be limited by the re-
mote site and that the limitation must play a causal role in the injury for 
it to be covered by the Alaska Workers’ Compensation Act.143  The court 
indicated that if in a situation similar to Norcon, an employee’s heart 
failure was caused by a sudden burst of cold water during his shower, 
the restriction of the choice of showers presented by the remote site 
might have brought the injury within the remote site doctrine.144 
V.  CONCLUSION 
When an employee works and resides at a remote site, his personal 
activities are governed by the limitations of that site.  Because the em-
ployee is required to eat, sleep, and socialize on the work premises, ac-
tivities that are not normally related to employment become an integral 
part of the working conditions of the job.  Recreational activities, travel 
to and from the work site, and personal activities performed on-site that 
are not normally encompassed by workers’ compensation are covered in 
these instances under the remote site doctrine.  The only requirement for 
such coverage is that the personal activity engaged in must be a result of 
limited choices offered at the site, and the choice dictated by the site 
must play a causal role in the injury. 
Legislative attempts to narrow the application of Alaska’s remote 
site doctrine do not appear to have altered the courts’ approach to the is-
sue.  Instead, the doctrine is alive and well in Alaska.  Rather than di-
minishing the reach of the doctrine, courts have instead applied the re-
mote site analysis within the framework of the statutory amendment, by 
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absorbing this analysis into the inquiry of whether an employee’s activ-
ity is an “employer-sanctioned activity.” 
